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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECIsIONs SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BANKRUPTCY.
- The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,
decides in B. F. Roden Grocery Co. v. Bacon, 133 Fed. 515,
Proceedings that where a creditor of a bankrupt holds a
in state written waiver of exemptions, which is per-
Court mitted by the law of the state, the court of bank-
ruptcy should not, on application of the bankrupt, enjoin
him from prosecuting an attachment suit -in a state court
against property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt, in any
event not longer than until the property shall have been set
aside as exempt by the trustee, the validity of the waiver
being a matter immaterial to the court of bankruptcy, and
one for the state court to determine.
The United States District Court (N. D. New York) de-
cides In re Levey, 133 Fed. 572, that a trustee in bankruptcy
Discbarge is a "party in interest" within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and may file and
prosecute specifications of objection to the bankrupt's dis-
charge so long as he is claiming and seeking to recover
property or money from the bankrupt alleged to belong to
the estate and to be wrongfully withheld or concealed.
The United States District Court (E. D. Missouri)
decides In re E. I. Arnold & Co., 133 Fed. 789, that credi-
Gambling tors of bankrupts who advanced money to them
Transactions on the strength of their fraudulent representa-
tions that they were earning sufficient profits to pay a stipu-
lated weekly interest, that they were solvent and responsible
and had on hand sufficient money to pay all their depositors
the amount of their deposits, and that they did not pay divi-
dends out of receipts, may prove up their claims in bank-
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ruptcy proceedings, although they knew and intehded that
the money which they advanced to the bankrupts would be
used in gambling ventures.
The United States District Court (N. D. Pennsylvania)
decides In re Lines, 133 Fed. 803, that where, after distress
Distrcss by a landlord, the tenant is adjudicated a bank-
for Rent rupt, the necessary effect is to put the property
under the control of the bankruptcy court, which will stay
further proceedings with the distress, and require the land-
lord to submit his rights to that court for adjudication.
BANKS.
In Western Bank of Louisville v. Coldewey's Ex'x, 83
S. W. 629, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that
Wrongful where the president of a bank wrongfully per-
Loans mitted his son to overdraw his account, and
thereafter the son made a deed of tnst for the benefit of
his creditors; and the bank, together with other creditors,
agreed in consideration of the conveyance to look only to
the assets so conveyed for the satisfaction of its claims
against the son, the bank was not estopped from bringing
an action against the estate of the pr,'sident for loss sus-
tained by his breach of trust in permitting the overdrafts.
BILLS AND NOTES.
In Smith v. Willing, ioi N. W. 692, the facts were as
follows: A note was executed in Illinois on a printed form
Judgment containing a single blank after the words "pay
Note: Exec- to the order of" and followed by the word
tion In Stank " dollars." In this blank the words "twenty-
five, hundred" were .inserted so as to leave no space in front
of them for the name of the payee. The note contained
also a provision for confessing judgment in favor of the
holder. The attorney for the holder inserted his name by
interlining it between the words" pay to the order of" and
the words "twenty-five hundred," and thereupon took
judgment in Illinois in his favor by confession. Suit was
brought on this judgment in Wisconsin, where the Supreme
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Court held that such judgment might be attacked on the
ground that the note was not negotiable in view of the omis-
sion of the name of the payee, but was subject to any defences
that might have existed between the original parties thereto,
and there being such defences in this case the holder ought
not to have been permitted to recover. Two judges dis-
sent. Compare Atkinson v. Foster, 134 Ill. 472.
CARRIERS.
It is held in Southern Ry. Co. v. Lockwood Mfg. Co.,
37 S. 667, that where a railway ran a car on to a siding
Lie,: so that a consignee might unload the same, ihis
Demurrage was not such an absolute delivery to the con-
Charges signee as to preclude the carrier from later
asserting his lien on the consignment to protect himself as
to demurrage charges where Such. car was. not unloaded
within the time limit, and where under the contract of ship-
ment the carrier was entitled to a lien for such charges.
Compare Miller v. Georgia, etc., Banking Co., 88 Ga. 563.
In Reilly v. New York City Ry. Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 319,
it appeared that a passenger had left a street-car after being
Assault by refused change by the conductor, and later,
Servant while waiting in the station of the defendant's
street-railway company, had spoken tb the conductor about
the matter, whereupon the conductor had assaulted him.
He then brought suit against the company, but the court
denies him a recovery on the ground that his relation to
the company as passenger had ceased and the conductor
was not acting within the scope of his authority in commit-
ting the assault. Compare Stewart v. Brooklyn and Cross-
town Ry. Co., 90 N. Y. 388.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi decides in Illinois Cent.
R. Co. v. Smith, 37 S. 643, that a common carrier of pas-.
Refusal of sengers may refuse transportation to a person
Passencger who, on account of physical or mental disability,
is likely to require attention from the carrier or the passen-
gers and to be unable to take care of himself, but where a
person seemingly unable to take care of himself is known
to the carrier to be, as a matter of fact, able to do so, he
cannot be refused transportation. The reasonableness or
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unreasonableness of the refusal of a passenger, it is held,
is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Compare
Zachary v. Railroad, 75 Miss. 751, 4 L. R. A. 385.
In Lenibeck v. Jarzis Tcrminal Cold Storage Co., 59 Ati.
360, it appeared that a carrier delivered goods to a con-
Li n for signee upon the promise of the consignee to
Freight: hold then until the freight should be paid. The
Delivery consignee, however, delivered the goods to a
third party as pledgee, such third party having no knowl-
edge of this agreement. The Court of Chancery of New
Jersey decides that as against him the carrier had lost its
lien, delivery to the consignee being sufficient as against
all persons taking without notice to waive his lien, no mat-
ter what the secret agreement between himself and the
consignee might have been. Compare AcFarland v..
Wheeler, 26 \Wend. 467, 474-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.
In Spead v. Ton linson, 59 At. 376, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire deals with a suit brought to. recover
Liabilityfor damages for unsuccessful treatment by one
Negligence professing to be a Christian Science healer. The
court, holding that standard of care by which such per-
son is to be judged is the care, skill, and knowledge of an
ordinary Christian Science healer and not that of an ordi-
nary physician, decides that where a person has intelligently
and voluntarily consented to follow the advice and abide
by the result of the prayers of a Christian Science healer
he -cannot later recover damages for negligence based on
the ground that public policy is opposed to such treatment.
Compare Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 903, 20 L. R. A.
838.
CONSTITUTION.
In Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. v. Cheatwood's Adrn'x, 49
S. E. 489, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia de-
Consideration cides that where a constitutional provision of
of Provision one state is incorporated in the constitution
of inother, the construction placed upon the provision by
the courts of the former state before its adoption in the
latter must be adopted by the courts of the latter state.
314
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
CONVERSION.
Where plaintiff had delivered to defendant a case con-
taining merchandise to be transported by it, and defendant
Loss by failed to deliver the goods and when asked for
Carrier the return of the same claimed they had been
lost, there is no conversion of such goods: New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, in Goldbowitz v. M etro-
politan Express Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 318. With this de-
cision compare Rubin v. Wells, Fargo Ex. Co., 85 N. Y.
Supp. iio8.
CORPORATIONS.
It is decided by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Term, in Harris v. Vienna Ice-Cream Co., 91 N. Y. Supp.
Employment 317, that where the president and secretary of
of Physicians a corporation had requested a physician to ren-
der professional services to two employees of the corpora-
tion, the corporation was not liable therefor in the absence
of a showing that the services rendered were for the bene-
fit of the corporation or in satisfaction of a claim, if any
there might be against it. "Persons dealing with the offi-
cers of a corporation or with persons assuming to represent
it are chargeable with notice of the purposes of its creation
and its powers and with the authority, actual or apparent,
of its officers or agents with whom they deal." Wilson v.
Kings County El. R. R. Co., 114 N. Y. 467.
Intercorporate relations are constantly giving rise to per-
plexing questions, one of which appears in the. decision of
Voting Own the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in O'Con-
Stock nor v. International Silver Co., 59 Adt. 321.
The statute of New Jersey forbids the stock of a corpora-
tion belonging to itself to be voted on. It is held in the
case referred to that this prevents the directors of a corpo-
ration from voting stock of the corporation owned by an-
other corporation of which the corporation in question has
purchased all the capital stock. Compare American Rail-
way Frog Co. v. Haven, IOI MasS. 398.
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In re Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012, the United States Circuit
Court (D. Washington, W. D.) decides that where a
Acquittal United States soldier killed a fellow-soldier
during a military encampment, and on being
surrendered to the civil authorities of the state was prose-
cuted for murder and acquitted, such acquittal, though a
final determination of his innocence of murder and of each
lesser offence necessarily included therein, was no bar to
his subsequent military arrest and trial by a general court-
martial for "conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline," in violation of the sixty-second article
of war, though such court-martial was based on the same
act. Compare Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 139.
EVIDENCE.
In Stout v. Sands, 49 S. E. 428, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia decides that suppression by one
Suppression: party to a suit of a document relied upon as
Presumptions evidence by the opposite party is not equiva-
lent to an admission oi the truth of the claim of the
latter respecting its contents, and does not dispense with
the necessity of prima-facie proof of such claim sufficient
to sustain a judgment or decree. But when a prima-
facie case is made, and doubt is cast upon it by rebut-
tal evidence or otherwise, suppression of the document
raises a strong inference against the party failing to produce
it and determines the point in favor of the other party. It
is furthe," held +hat though a party cannot impeach a witness
called by him, he is not bound by all such witness says. He
may.prove the material facts by other evidence, even though
the effect of it is to directly contradict his own witness, but
he cannot show that the witness has made contradictory
statements out of court. Compare "Wheelihg v. Hawley,
18 W. Va. 472-
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
The question as to what constitutes " doing. business"
within the .meaning of the state statutes imposing restric-
Business tions or creating conditions on foreign corpo-
withl.uthe rations doing business within their boundaries
State is an interesting one, and one upon which the
cases do not seem to have established a very broad and
comprehensive basis on which the law may be developed.
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This question is raised in the case of American Contractor
Pub. Co. v. Bagge, 9i N. Y. Supp. 73- In that case a
foreign corporation engaged in publishing a magazine in
Illinois employed an agent in New York to solicit orders
for advertisements. These orders were forwarded to Illi-
nois for acceptance, and, if accepted, the advertisements
appeared in the magazine. The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Term, holds that this does not constitute a "doing
business" within the meaning of the New York laws re-
quiring foreign corporations doing business in New York
to obtain a certificate and pay a license tax. Compare
Jones v. Keeler, 81 N. Y. Supp. 648.
FREIGHT RATES.
The Supreme Court of Texas decides in Texas and P.
Ry. Co. v. Mugg & Driden, 83 S. V. 8oo, that where cer-
rlsrepresen- tain shippers contracted for the sale of coal at
tatlons a certain price, basing their price on the repre-
sentations of the carrier's agent that the freight would be
as stated by him, and, nevertheless, were compelled to pay
a higher rate, the carrier is liable for damages occasioned
by such misrepresentations notwithstanding the fact that
the agent named a rate less than the rate posted in accord-
ance with the interstate commerce law. Compare Pond-
Decker Lumber Co. v. Spencer, 86 Fed. 846.
GAMBLING.
In New York the liquor tax law prohibits gambling on
the premises occupied by a pharmacist authorized to sell
Slot liquor. In Cullinan v. Hosmer, 91 N. Y. Supp.
Machines 6o7, the question arises whether a slot-machine
in a drug-store, which was so arranged that a person who
dropped five cents into it became entitled to at least one
cigar, and possibly to three, said cigars being sold at five
cents each, constituted gambling. The New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department), with one
judge dissenting, decides that it is not a form of gambling.
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GAME
It is held by the Suprer. e Court of Arkansas in State v.
Mallory, 83 S. XV. 955, that the state's ownership of fish
State and game is not such a proprietary'interest as
Ownership will authorize a sale thereof or the granting of
special interest therein or license to enjoy, but is solely for
the purposes of regulation and preservation for the com-
mon use, and is not inconsistent with a claim of individual
or special ownership by the owner of the soil if it be found
that there can be any such individual or special ownership.
It is therefore decided that an act of the state purporting
to protect the game and fish of the state and declaring it
unlawful for any non-resident to game or fish at any season
constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against denying the equal protection of the law in so far
as it prevents the same enjoyment of his property right by
a non-resident landowner as is afforded a resident land-
owner. It is further held that the taking away of such right
as a non-resident is without due process of law. Two judges
dissent. Compare Geer v. Cont., I61 U. S. 519.
INSURANCE.
In Donley v. Glenn's Falls Ins Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 302,
the New York Supreniie Court (Appellate Division, Fourth
Breach of Department) decides, against the dissent of two
Warranty judges, that where there is a breach of the
usual warranty as to the title of land on which the insured
building is located, such breach does not avoid the policy
as to personalty which is situated in the building. The
prevailing and dissenting opinions present a very satisfac-
tory review of the decisions and of the questions involved.
Compare Pratt v. Dwelling House Mit. Fire Ins. Co., i30
N. Y. 206.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
In Eschniann v. Atkinson, 91 N. Y. Supp. 319, it is de-
cided by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
Constructive that the refusal on the part of the owner of an
Eviction apartment to permit a colored servant to use
the'elevator in the apartment constituted a constructive
eviction of the master of such servant under the facts of
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
LANDLORD AND TENANT (Continued).
that case, there not being sufficient evidence in the mind
of the court to bring home to the defendant the existence
of a rule that such servants should be excluded from the
building. Compare Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432.
LIMITATIONS.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina decides in Devine
v. Miller, 49 S. E. 479, that an administrator by his promise
Promise of in writing may renew a note of his intestate
Adminis. before it is barred so as to bind the personalty,
trator but the real estate can only be affected by the
promise of an heir to the extent of his interest. Compare
Bolt v. Dawkins, 16 S. C. 211.
LOCAL ACT.
In Commonwealth ex rel Miller & Sons v. Brown, 59
At]. 479, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, althorgh
Repeal: recognizing the general rule that a local act is
GeOern llaw not regarded as repealed by a general act on
the same subject with inconsistent provisions, unless a con-
trary intent is clearly apparent, decides, however, that where
a general act is passed to carry into effect a general man-
datory provision of the state constitutions all acts incon-
sistent therewith, including local acts, are thereby repealed.
Compare Commonwealth v. Summerville, 204 Pa. 3oo.
MORTGAGES.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, holding that al-
though ordinarily the burden of proving the payment of a
For upport: mortgage indebtedness is on the mortgagor,
Possession decides in David v. Poland, 59 Atl. 520, that
it is otherwise in the case of a mortgage given for the sup-
port of the mortgagee where it is provided in the-mortgage
that the support shall be furnished the mortgagee upon the
premises described in the mortgage. In such a case the
implication is clear that it was the intention of the parties
that the mortgagor should retain possession of the premises
until a breach of the condition, because possession by him is
absolutely necessary in order to enable him to perform the
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condition of the mortgage. In such a case the burden of
proving that there has been a breach of the condition of
the mortgage is upon the mortgagee or upon an assignee
who seeks to recover possession of the premises. With
this decision compare Hadley v. Hadley, 8o Me. 459-
It is decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Liskey v. Snyder, 49 S. E. 515, that a pur-
Purchaseat chase of real estate at a judicial sale by
JudicialSale strangers to the proceeding, and contempora-
neous resale thereof by them to the debtor by an execu-
tory contract in writing, whereby he is charged with a
certain sum -in addition to the amount for which it sold
at the judicial sale, all in pursuance of a prior verbal con-
tract, though in form a purchase of the land, is regarded
in equity as a loan of money on the land as security, and
the rights of the parties are determined by the principles
governing the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee.
NEGLIGENCE.
The tendency of the courts to create rules of law as to
what does or does not constitute negligence in accident
P esenger cases is continually appearing in the decisions.
oan Run-ing- An illustration of this occurs in Rosen v. Dry
Board Dock, E. B. and B. 1?. Co., 91 N. Y. Supp.
333, where it is decided as a matter of law that a person
who, because a car is crowded, stands on the running-
board is guilty of contributory negligence, .where he was
injured by being struck by the shaft of a wagon, which
other passengers had avoided by keeping close to the car
or getting between the seats. It seems to be regarded as
settled that where a passenger can find room to stand be-
tween the seats, even though these run latitudinally, it is
negligent for him to ride on the running-board.
Decisions have frequently questioned the logical pro-
priety of drawing a distinction between the so-called degrees
Gross of negligence, and the criticism upon such dis-
Negligence tinction seems to be entitled to respect In
Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., IOI N. W. 672, the
court lays down certain distinctions which may perhaps be
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of service in connection with the cases on this question.
The term "negligence," it is said, by itself suggests only
inadvertence or want of ordinary care, and however great
may be the degree of such want of care, so long as the in-
advertence remains, wilfulness is excluded. On the other
hand, the court says the term "gross negligence" signifies
wilfulness. It involves intent, actual or constructive, which
is a characteristic of criminal liability. Gross negligence
does not include ordinary negligence, and proof of the for-
mer does not prove, but rather disproves, the latter. In
connection with this decision compare Cleveland, etc., R.
W. Co. v. Miller, 149 Ind. 490, 501.
OYSTERS.
In Vroom v. Tilly, 91 N. Y. Supp. 51, the Supreme Court.
(Appellate Division, Second Department) decides that it is
Oyster Beds: not necessary that a person who alleges owner-
Ownership ship in certain oyster-beds should own the land
on which they are situated, and the fact that he has been
a trespasser at such place does not entitle the owner of
the land as against him to take them for his own use,
although he may compel the person who planted them to
take them up, or although he might himself remove them
as a nuisance. One judge dissents and the case is an inter-
esting discussion of the point involved in view of the rather
few decisions on this subject. Compare Supter v. Van-
Derbeer, 47 Hun. 366.
PHOTOGRAPHS.
In Barb v. Oxford Paper Co., 59 Atl. 29 o, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine decides that photographs, *to be
Admissibility admissible as evidence, should simply show con-
ditions existing at the time in question. When
taken with men in various assumed postures, and things in
various assumed situations, in order to illustrate the claims
and contentions of the parties, they should not be admitted.
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Several decisions have recently appeared as to the right
of a public service corporation to condemn corporate stock.
Condemna. An "mportant decision is handed down by the
tion of stock Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in New
of otherRoads York, N. H. and H. R. Co. v. Offield, 59 Atl.
5io, relating to this question. A law of Connecticut author-
izes a railroad company which has acquired more than three-
fourths of the stock of another railroad company and can-
not agree with the holders of the outstanding stock for the
purchase thereof, to condemn such stock on a finding that
it would be for the public interest. It is held that such stat-
ute is constitutional, and that it is for the public interest
that a railroad company should condemn the few shares of
outstanding stock where it is contemplating extensive im-
provements and desires to use the credit of the road whose
stock it wishes to condemn to raise funds for the improve-
ments, it itself not possessing the credit necessary.. Compare
Black v. Delaware and R. C. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130.
TAXES.
In Penobscot Chemical Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of Town
of Bradley, 59 At. 83, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Assessment: decides that the value, as distinguished from
Valuation valuation, of other similar property in the town
similarly situated, as shown by the evidence of actual sales,
or by the opinion of properly qualified witnesses, expressed
in court, is admissible upon the question of true value. Com-
pare Manchester Mills v. Manchester, 57 N. H. 3o9.
TOWNS.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. laying down the
general rule that in maintaining a police lock-up a town is
Liabilities pursuing, not a municipal purpose, but a public
purpose, viz., the maintenance of the justice
and peace of the state; and hence, in the absence of any
statute imposing liability, the town is not liable for neglect
of its selectmen in the care of it, holds in Mains v. Inhabi-
tants of Ft. Fairfield, 59 Atl. 87, that the fact that a prisoner
committed by a constable to a town lock-up suffered damage
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from its neglected condition does not make the town liable
to an action therefor.
WATER-COURSES.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decides
in Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co., 49 S. E. 378, that overflow
Overflow waters of a natural stream in times of ordinary
flood or freshet flowing over or standing upon
the adjacent lowlands do not cease to be part of the stream,
unless and until separated therefrom so as to prevent their
return to its channel.
WILLS.
The Prerogative Court of New Jersey decides In re Mid-
dleton's Will, 59 Atl. 454, that without proof that a mis-
Undue tress influenced a testator directly in procuring
Influence a will in her favor, it cannot be inferred from
their relation that she secured an influence over him which
she would naturally and improperly exert to advance her
interest. Compare Arnault v. Arnault, 52 N. J. Eq. 8oi.
The statutory law of Wisconsin, like the statutory law
of many other states, provides that a child born after the
After-Born making of his parent's will, for whom no pro-
Children vision is made in the will, shall share in the
estate as if the parent had died intestate, unless it appears
from the will that the parent intended to make no pro-
vision for such child. Another statutory provision is to
the effect that where children are adopted by legal pro-
ceedings, children so adopted shall be deemed, for the pur-.
poses of inheritance and all other legal purposes, the same
as if they had been born in lawful wedlock. Construing
these provisions, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides
It re Sandon's Will, IO N. W. IO89, that where a child
had been legally adopted after her adoptive father had
made his will she was entitled to share in her father's estate
as if he had died intestate, where no mention of her or
provision for her was made in his will. The court holds
that for the purposes of these provisions the date of adop-
tion of an adopted child is equivalent to the date of the
birth of a parent's own child, nor can evidence be received
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to show that he intended to make no mention of such child
unless the will is ambiguous or doubtful on its face. Com-
pare Bresee v. Stilcs, 22 Wis. 120.
In Bush v. Whitaker, 91 N. Y. Supp. 616, it appeared
that an uncle wrote to his nephew, telling him that if there
Agreement were- no change in his family he would will
to Bequeath: him one-half of his property, and then went
Specific Per- on to say, "You get me up a cane that will be
formance good enough for you when I get through with
it, and I will leave you the cane and one thousand dollars
with it." The nephew secured a cane for his uncle, which the
latter accepted and used for many years, but failed to leave
the one thousand dollars to his nephew, bequeathing sub-
stantially all his property to an adopted daughter. The
court holds that the nephew is entitled to specific perform-
ance of the contract. Compare Ozuens v. McNally, 113 Cal.
444, 33 L. R. A. 369, where an unmarried man contracted
to give all his property to his niece if she would take care
of hm. Later he married and died without performing his
agreement. The court efuses to enforce the contract on
the ground that the rights of an innocent third party had
intervened and hardship would result to the widow.
